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LHC MACHINE PROTECTION
For nominal beam parameters at 7 TeV/c each of the two LHC proton beams has a stored energy of 362 MJ
threatening to damage accelerator equipment in case of uncontrolled beam loss. The energy stored in the
magnet system at 7 TeV/c will exceed 10 GJ. In order to avoid damage of accelerator equipment, complex
machine protection systems are required. Magnet protection and powering interlock systems must be
operational already before commissioning the magnet powering system. Beam operation, throughout the
operational cycle from injection to colliding beams, requires fully operational protection systems, including
beam interlock systems, beam dumping system, beam instrumentation (mainly beam loss monitors) as well
as collimators and beam absorbers. Details of LHC machine protection have been presented on several
occasions and the systems involved in protection are well documented [1]. This paper gives an overview of
LHC machine protection, discusses the progress with the implementation and presents first results from the
commissioning of some systems.
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INTRODUCTION 
For nominal beam parameters at 7 TeV/c each of the 
two LHC proton beams has a stored energy of 362 MJ 
threatening to damage accelerator equipment in case of 
uncontrolled beam loss. The energy stored in the magnet 
system at 7 TeV/c will exceed 10 GJ. In order to avoid 
damage of accelerator equipment, complex machine 
protection systems are required. Magnet protection and 
powering interlock systems must be operational already 
before commissioning the magnet powering system. 
Beam operation, throughout the operational cycle from 
injection to colliding beams, requires fully operational 
protection systems, including beam interlock systems, 
beam dumping system, beam instrumentation (mainly 
beam loss monitors) as well as collimators and beam 
absorbers. 
Details of LHC machine protection have been 
presented on several occasions and the systems involved 
in protection are well documented [1]. This paper gives 
an overview of LHC machine protection, discusses the 
progress with the implementation and presents first results 
from the commissioning of some systems.  
LHC CYCLE AND ENERGY STORED IN 
THE BEAM 
The LHC beam is prepared in the CERN accelerator 
chain. Before transfer to LHC, the beam is accelerated in 
the SPS from 26 GeV/c to the LHC injection momentum 
of 450 GeV/c. During fast extraction, the closed orbit 
around the extraction point in the SPS must be within 
predefined limits. When the beam is extracted the strength 
of all magnets in the transfer line and the LHC must be 
correct and nothing should block the beam passage.  
During the injection phase 12 batches per beam are 
transferred to LHC (see the LHC operational cycle in 
Fig.1) via 3 km long transfer lines. The energy stored in a 
batch with either 216 or 288 bunches exceeds two MJ, in 
the same order as the energy of the stored beams in 
TEVATRON or HERA. The LHC is the first accelerator 
with the intensity of the injected beam already far above 
damage threshold. Protection during the injection process 
is mandatory. 
The injection process for the two beams will take about 
15 min. When filling of the LHC rings is completed, the 
protons are accelerated to a momentum of 7 TeV/c, with 
360 MJ stored in each of the two beams. This is the most 
critical phase of operation, due to the large energy stored 
in the beams and the very low quench margin of the 
superconducting magnets in case of beam loss. Normally, 
the beams will collide for several hours during a physics 
fill. At the end of a fill or after the detection of a failure, 
the beams are extracted into specially designed absorbers 
(beam dump blocks). 
At 7 TeV/c, a fraction of about 10-8 of the full beam 
could already quench a magnet. Fast beam loss with an 
intensity of about 5% of one single bunch with nominal 
intensity could damage equipment (e.g. superconducting 
coils). The only component that can stand a loss of the 
full beam is the beam dump block - all other components 
would be damaged. The LHC beams must ALWAYS be 
extracted into the beam dump blocks at the end of a fill or 
in case of failure.  
The design of the LHC protection elements is based on 
energy deposition simulations and assumptions for the 
damage levels. A dedicated experiment was carried out to 
cross-check the validity of this approach by damaging 
material in a controlled way with beam [2]. The 
450 GeV/c beam with transverse rms dimensions of about 
1 mm extracted from the SPS was directed onto a 
specially designed high-Z target comprising several 
typical materials used for LHC equipment. The beam 
intensities were chosen to exceed the damage limits of 
parts of the target, between 2⋅1012 and 8⋅1012 protons. The 
results of the damage test show good agreement with the 
simulations, with a damage threshold in the order of some 
1012 protons, depending on the material. 
BEAM INTERLOCK SYSTEMS 
There are several independent beam interlock systems 
for the SPS ring, SPS extraction and transfer, LHC 
injection and LHC ring that are linked to ensure safe 
operation throughout the operational cycle. The systems 
are based on hardware that has been developed for the 
LHC, with the first systems already implemented for the 
SPS ring and for the SPS extraction system. The interlock 
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systems are also used for CNGS high intensity operation 
since one of the SPS extraction zones is used for sending 
beam to the CNGS target as well as to the LHC. 
• The role of the SPS beam interlock system is to 
concentrate beam dump requests from the various 
monitoring systems and to transmit such requests to 
the SPS beam dumping system. Typical inputs come 
from beam loss monitors, power converters, vacuum 
equipment etc. When a signal changes from TRUE to 
FALSE, the beam dump is triggered. A new system 
with LHC type hardware has been installed for the 
2007 run. 
• The SPS extraction interlock system allows beam 
extraction only when the conditions for extraction are 
valid, and all elements downstream of the kicker 
magnets are in the correct state. It opens a window of 
about 3 ms, during which the Pulse Forming Networks 
of the kicker magnets can be charged, and extraction 
is permitted during another 3 ms window, when the 
conditions are still valid.  
• The LHC injection interlock system allows beam 
injection into LHC only when the LHC ring is ready 
for beam, the injection elements have correct settings 
and the elements at the end of the transfer line are 
ready. 
• The LHC beam interlock system is similar to the SPS 
beam interlock system concentrating all beam dump 
requests and triggering the beam dump, but with many 
more inputs from the monitoring systems (see later). 
 
A typical interlock controller includes input channels 
for up to 14 signals (see Fig.2). One additional input is the 
so-called “safe beam flag” which for the SPS is derived 
from the beam intensity. If the beam is considered to be 
safe, part of the signals can be masked. When the beam 
intensity is above a certain level, the safe beam flag 
becomes false and masks are not taken into account. For 
the LHC, the safe beam flag will be derived from beam 
intensity and energy. 
It is possible to extract beam from the SPS without 
receiving a beam permit from LHC, if for the extraction 
channel concerned the downstream beam dump block in 
the transfer line is inserted or the beam is extracted 
towards the target of the CNGS experiment [3]. The 
dump blocks are designed to absorb beam with nominal 
intensity, for example for tests. 
MACHINE PROTECTION DURING BEAM 
TRANSFER 
Safe beam transfer and injection into LHC relies on 
correct settings of all magnet currents, both for slow and 
fast pulsing magnets. All movable elements must be in 
OUT position, such as vacuum valves, beam screens, etc. 
The momentum of beam in the SPS must match the 
energy of the transfer line, for CNGS (400 GeV/c) or 
LHC (450 GeV/c). The correct magnet current settings 
are verified using a permit signal that is TRUE only when 
the measured magnet current is within a predefined 
window (see Fig.4). This verification is done in the power 
converter controller via real time software and takes a few 
ms [4]. For magnets where the current change can be 
critical within less than some ms, Fast Magnet Current 
change Monitors (FMCM) are installed. This is a joint 
development with DESY based on a system successfully 
operating at HERA for some years [5]. It allows detecting 
magnet current changes within a fraction of a ms. 
FMCMs are installed on critical magnets, the extraction 
septa and some magnets in the transfer lines. Such 
monitors will also be installed for some ten electrical 
circuits with normal conducting magnets in the LHC.  
Both the SPS extraction and the LHC injection kicker 
systems must fire at the correct time with the correct 
strength. Since a failure of these kicker systems cannot be 
excluded, a beam absorber is installed downstream of 
these kicker magnets. Several collimators at the end of the 
transfer line to the LHC limit the aperture to ensure that 
the beam enters the LHC correctly. Downstream of the 
LHC injection kicker several other absorbers are installed, 
to capture beam in case of a failure of the LHC injection 
kicker. Beam loss monitors are used for the analysis of 
the losses during transfer, inhibiting the following 
extraction if losses exceed a predefined threshold. 
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Figure 3: Beam transfer from SPS to LHC and to the 
CNGS target 
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Commissioning of CNGS with high intensity beam was 
done in 2006. Extraction is via the same transfer line as 
for LHC up to a switching magnet that separates the 
CNGS line and the TI8 line for LHC. 
During the CNGS run all machine protection devices 
for the extraction zones and for the common part of the 
transfer line were commissioned, in particular the beam 
interlock system. Masking of some interlocks with the 
“safe beam flag” has been extensively used during 
commissioning with low intensity beams. 
MACHINE PROTECTION FOR 
CIRCULATING BEAMS IN LHC 
The number of possible failures that have an impact on 
the beam is huge: 
• Failure in the powering system (magnet quench, 
power converter trip, …) 
• An object touching the beam (vacuum valve, 
collimator, experimental detector, bad vacuum, …) 
• Operational failure (operator, controls, timing, …) 
• Beam instability 
• Loss of RF 
• Others 
For the design of the protection system it is important 
to understand how fast the beams can become unstable 
and need to be extracted.  
Beam losses during injection, extraction, and by 
accidentally deflecting the beams with a kicker magnet 
can occur within a single turn. To protect equipment 
against some of these failures, safe operation relies on 
absorbers installed at all critical locations capturing mis-
kicked beam. In order to prevent accidental firing of the 
injection kicker, the injection kicker magnets are switched 
off and interlocked when injection is finished. Kicker 
magnets for beam observation, e.g. Q-measurement and 
aperture exploration, produce either only a small 
deflection or are interlocked to operate with low intensity 
beam only. 
Extensive simulations have been performed to 
determine the time constant for the loss of circulating 
beam after a magnet failure [6,7]. A powering failure for 
a normal conducting magnet string (D1 magnets) installed 
in a region with very high beta function leads to the 
fastest beam loss.  The most critical failure at 7 TeV/c is a 
trip of the power converter, and at injection a failure that 
sets the voltage of the power converter to the maximum 
value. It would take between some turns to some 
milliseconds until particles start to touch the aperture.   
For most magnet failures, particles start to be lost after 
a time between about five ms and several seconds, e.g. 
after a quench of a magnet or a trip of a power converter. 
Considering the different failure scenarios, the machine 
protection strategy for circulating beams is derived: 
• Definition of the aperture by the collimator jaws, 
with beam loss monitors close to the collimators [8]. 
• Additional ~3600 beam loss monitors distributed at 
possible loss locations around the ring [9]. 
• Early detection of failures within the equipment that 
acts on the beams, to generate a beam dump request 
before the beam is affected.  
• Active monitoring of the beam with fast and reliable 
beam instrumentation, to detect abnormal beam 
conditions and to generate a beam dump request 
within a very short time, down to one machine turn 
(89 μs).  
 
• Reliable transmission of a beam dump request to the 
beam dumping system by a distributed interlock 
system. For all interlocks, an active signal is required 
for operation, and the absence of the signal is 
considered as beam dump request and injection 
inhibit [10]. 
• Reliable operation of the beam dumping system upon 
reception of a dump request or internal fault 
detection, to safely extract the beams onto the 
external dump blocks. 
• Passive protection by beam absorbers and collimators 
for specific failure cases. 
• Redundancy in the protection system such that 
failures may be detected by more than just a single 
system. 
• Very high safety and reliability standards that are 
applied in the design of the core protection systems, 
in general done in hardware. 
From this strategy the core systems for machine 
protection are identified: 
• The LHC beam interlock system has a specific role 
since it is connected to all systems for protection (see 
Fig.5).  
• Beam Dumping System: operation with beam is only 
possible when the beam dumping system is ready and 
provides a beam permit signal. 
• The beam loss monitor system with monitors close to 
superconducting magnets for quench and damage 
protection and at all aperture limitations should 
detect any kind of significant beam losses. 
• The collimation system defines the aperture to ensure 
that particles are lost first on collimators and protects 
 




















Figure 4: Interlocking of magnet current during cycle 
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against quenches of superconducting magnets. The 
collimator jaws (~100) must be correctly positioned.  
• The magnet powering system must be fully 
operational. No fault or quench should be reported by 
the quench detection system and the Fast Magnet 
current Change Monitors. 
There are several other systems that have links to the 
beam interlock system: 
• Monitors for the beam position, to detect low 
lifetime, to detect particles in the abort gap, etc. 
• The access system must permit beam operation. 
• Nothing should block the aperture (vacuum valves, 
beam screens, experimental detectors, safety 
stoppers, etc. must be all OUT). 
• Several interlocks from operations can inhibit the 
beam, such as switches in the control room, the 
software interlock system and software for process 
control (sequencer). 
• Other inputs include the RF system, transverse 
feedback, beam aperture kickers and inputs from 
LHC experiments. 
In case of a beam dump request, the beam interlock 
system provides a trigger via the timing system to many 
LHC systems for transient recording of the event.  
COMMISSIONING STARTED 
An interlock system for normal conducting magnets to 
prevent magnets from overheating has been used for 
LEIR (Low Energy Ion Ring, an ion accumulator for LHC 
ion operation) for two years. Recently, a similar system 
for the LHC was commissioned. 
The commissioning of the LHC superconducting 
magnet powering system [11] started during spring 2007. 
Powering of superconducting magnets requires 
operational magnet protection (quench detection and 
energy extraction) and the powering interlock systems. 
When a quench is detected, the signal is sent to the 
Powering Interlock Controller in the vicinity. This 
controller receives signals for a large number of electrical 
circuits, and triggers a beam dump via the Beam Interlock 
System in case of a failure in one of the circuits. The 
response after the quench detection is deterministic, since 
all transactions are done in hardware. The delay from the 
reception of the quench signal by the Powering Interlock 
Controller to the completion of a beam dump is about 
0.4 ms. During LHC hardware commissioning of the first 
LHC sector, the quench of one separation dipole magnet 
(D2) was recorded (see Fig.6). In this case the beam 
would be extracted before the current in the magnet 
started to change.  
MACHINE PROTECTION AND 
CONTROLS  
Efficient and reliable machine protection relies on the 
correct operation of all systems involved in protection as 
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Figure  5: Overview of the LHC Beam Interlock System and its links to other systems 
Figure 6: Signals from different systems after a 
quench of the D2 dipole magnet: magnet current and 
interlock signals 
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well as on well-defined operational procedures. The 
performance of the critical systems must be continuously 
monitored. In case of a beam dump the event must be 
analysed to verify if all the systems were operating 
correctly. The controls system plays an important role, in 
particular for the recording of data. Software interlocks 
complement the hardware based protection systems. The 
procedures during commissioning are executed with 
software (“sequencer”).   
Post Mortem Recording and Logging: Data needs to be 
logged, transient data recording is required after an event 
such as a beam dump, and software to analyse the data 
from various systems is required. The data must be 
accurately time stamped to allow correlating data from 
different systems. Our initial experience during the 
powering tests has been positive. Data from power 
converters, powering interlocks, quench protection and 
cryogenics are continuously recorded, and in case of 
quenches or other transient events the required signals 
were always captured. This allowed analysing various 
events, such as the quench shown in Fig.6. 
The Software Interlock System (SIS) provides 
additional protection for complex but also less critical 
conditions, on top of the hardwired interlock systems.  
One example is the surveillance of magnet currents at 
injection and during collisions to prevent failures such as 
the building up of local bumps that could drive the beam 
into equipment and would reduce the available aperture. 
Together with another failure, such as an asynchronous 
beam dump, this could lead to equipment damage. 
The reaction time of the SIS is at the level of a few 
seconds and it relies on the technical network, databases, 
etc., clearly not as safe as hardwired systems. 
The SIS had been developed with the LHC operation in 
mind, with the first application for the SPS replacing the 
outdated system. The new system turned out to be very 
reliable and easy to use. It is not decided whether the 
system will be active in the LHC from the beginning 
since its reliability needs to be checked, to avoid too 
many false beam aborts. Initially it may be limited to only 
sending alarms.  
Sequencer: The procedures for commissioning of the 
powering system have been defined in detail.  They can 
be executed by an operator or by a program (the 
“sequencer”) [12]. The sequencer is fully operational and 
is being used to perform the interlock and powering tests 
during LHC hardware commissioning. It will be extended 
to run commissioning and operational procedures during 
beam operation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is important to understand that there is not one single 
system for LHC machine protection; safe operation relies 
on several core systems, such as beam interlocks, beam 
dumping system, beam loss monitors, collimators and 
beam absorbers. Machine protection for LHC starts at the 
SPS, since the beams extracted from the SPS towards 
LHC have already a substantial damage potential. The 
different Beam Interlock Systems play a central role since 
they provides the links between different protection 
systems in the LHC and the SPS. In addition there are 
links with other systems required for operation. 
Although beam operation is still some time in the 
future, commissioning of some systems has started. 
During the commissioning of the LHC powering system, 
the correct functioning of the magnet protection and 
powering interlock systems is validated. During the SPS 
extraction tests and in particular during CNGS operation, 
the Beam Interlock System and the Fast Magnet Current 
change Monitors for SPS extraction zone and transfer 
lines were commissioned. Since 2007 the SPS ring 
operates with a LHC type Beam Interlock System. Before 
starting-up with beam, most input channels to the Beam 
Interlock System will be commissioned during “hardware 
commissioning” and “cold checkout”. 
Other systems became operational during 2007: the 
Software Interlock System, the Sequencer and the tools 
for transient data recording and analysis.  
The early commissioning of core systems allows 
validating hardware and software design choices and 
gaining experience with commissioning and operation of 
systems identical or similar to those to be used in LHC.  
To guarantee ‘Safe’ LHC operation, the commissioning 
procedures for the different parts of the machine 
protection systems are being prepared, taking advantage 
from a similar exercise performed for the Hardware 
Commissioning.  
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